Nooksack Judge Fired (In Her Own Words), and Why You (Each of You) Should Care

So a month of speculation ended on Friday with this Bellingham Herald story, and former Chief Judge Susan Alexander's explanation of her termination "without cause." 

After Judge Alexander passed a "random" drug test (for the second time this year), she was fired while finishing an opinion to compel an election that a Nooksack Tribal Council faction has simply refused to call---she was terminated "at a critical juncture" in the case, as she put it.

The Tribal Council faction decided to "take a different direction" with the Court, and are now going to replace Judge Alexander if they can "find a right fit with a judge."  There's no need to decipher these cryptic words.

Tribal courts are already met with a great deal of skepticism.  Consider Justice David Souter's concurrence in Nevada v. Hicks, whereby the U.S. Supreme Court took a sledgehammer to tribal court authority:

Tribal courts also differ from other American courts (and often from one another) in their structure, in the substantive law they apply, and in the independence of their judges. Although some modern tribal courts “mirror American courts” and “are guided by written codes, rules, procedures, and guidelines,” tribal law is still frequently unwritten...and is often “handed down orally or by example from one generation to another.” The resulting law applicable in tribal courts is a complex “mix of tribal codes and federal, state, and traditional law,” which would be unusually difficult for an outsider to sort out. 

Dollar General's pending assault on tribal courts parrots these words (describing itself as a "stranger" to tribal court jurisdiction, which should not be bound to the rules in an "unfamiliar court.")  Former U.S. Attorney Brendan Johnson puts it more plain: 

The premise of Dollar General’s case is that tribal courts are inherently incompetent and biased against non-members.

These same arguments were advanced by Republicans in Congress who opposed the limited Oliphant-fix that is the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013.  Indeed, to assuage concerns about the integrity of tribal judicial systems, Indian Country was forced to accept federal court de novo review of tribal court convictions of non-Indian wife beaters.

A few weeks ago Senators Jon Tester (D-Mont.) and Al Franken (D-Minn.) introduced the Tribal Youth and Community Protection Act of 2016.  According to Bryan Newland, the bill would

[E]xpand tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians for drug related crimes, domestic violence against children, and crimes committed against tribal law enforcement officers. The proposed bill comes on the heels of the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act, which allows Indian tribes to prosecute non-Indians in certain instances.

As this bill would further restore tribal court inherent criminal jurisdiction, it too will surely face skepticism from the likes of House Republicans and Dollar General.  Such critics will wield national legal headlines like "Nooksack Tribal Council Fired Judge, Chairman Confirms," to make their case against tribal courts.

So if you are or have been an advocate for the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act or Tribal Youth and Community Protection Act, or for a full Oliphant-fix, or for tribal justice systems in the face of assaults from the likes of Dollar General, or, more generally, for Native Nation and tribal capacity building, pause to reflect on what is happening at Nooksack.

Pause to reflect on how the insurrection at Nooksack impacts the issues you care about; how it affects all Indian governments and court systems; how it makes us all look.

(Likewise, if you advocate that "Native Lives Matter" when police take an Indian life, that the epidemic of Indian youth suicide requires more attention, or that mascots destroy tribal identity, pause to reflect on tribal destruction of Indian life and identity via disenrollment.)

You see, we can't have it both ways. We can't expect credence from the Congress or federal courts when we advocate for what is just and right for Indian people and tribal courts, while we simultaneously turn a deaf ear to what is so unjust and wrong in Indian Country. 

Gabe Galanda is the managing lawyer of Galanda Broadman, PLLC, an American Indian-owned law firm with offices in Seattle and Yakima, Washington and Bend, Oregon. He descends from the Nomlaki and Concow Tribes, belonging to the Round Valley Indian Confederation.

A New Tribal Stance Against Climate Change Emerges

By Ryan Dreveskracht

As sovereign nations, Tribes must take great efforts to fully exercise their rights, often in the face of the severe economic, societal, and environmental challenges.  Tribal sovereignty, culture, and ways of life are profoundly tested in these times by the added challenge of climate change, particularly in the Pacific Northwest.  According to a 2011 National Wildlife Federation study:

Tribes are disproportionately impacted by rapidly changing climates, manifested in ecological shifts and extreme weather events, as compared to the general population, due to the often marginal nature and/or location of many Tribal lands. The high dependence of Tribes upon their lands and natural resources to sustain their economic, cultural, and spiritual practices, the relatively poor state of their infrastructure, and the great need for financial and technical resources to recover from such events all contribute to the disproportionate impact on Tribes.

Among the study’s recommendations were an increase in federal funds for climate adaptation programs on tribal lands; greater exploitation of renewable resources, including solar power, on Indian reservations; and stronger collaboration among tribes on natural resources and climate change programs. The group also faulted the Department of Interior for not providing the money needed to help Indians deal with climate impacts they had virtually no part in creating. 

Last year, the Interior Department responded with a drop in the bucket, making a mere $8 million available via its Tribal Climate Resilience Program.  While the support is definitely needed, let’s just say that, absent litigation forcing it, Interior does not have a great track record of fulfilling its full fiduciary obligation to Indian Country.  See e.g. Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Lujan, 112 F.3d 1455, 1462 (10th Cir. 1997) (Tribe prevailed in proving “chronic underfunding” of Interior’s real estate, natural resources, law enforcement, Aid to Tribal Government, and water rights programs).

Lawsuits alleging harm to tribes caused by global warming have generally failed in the initial stages, however, because courts have found a lack of “standing” due to the plaintiffs’ alleged injury not being “fairly traceable” to the conduct of the defendant.  See e.g. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 870 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Communities for a Better Env’t v. E.P.A., 748 F.3d 333, 338 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (same); People of State of California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 06-05755, 2007 WL 2726871, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (no nuisance cause of action because regulation of global warming deemed a “policy decision of the kind reserved for the political branches of government”).

A new ruling from the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon may have created an inroad, however.  In the 100-page complaint in Juliana v. United States, No. 15-1517 (D. Or.), a group of younger individuals (aged 8-19) asserted harm from carbon pollution because of federal government action and/or inaction allegedly resulting in climate destabilization and ocean acidification.  The plaintiffs sued the United States and various government officials and agencies, alleging that:

·      The government has known for decades that carbon dioxide (CO2) pollution has been causing catastrophic climate change and has failed to take necessary action to curtail fossil fuel emissions.

·      The government and its agencies have taken action or failed to take action that has resulted in increased carbon pollution through fossil fuel extraction, production, consumption, transportation, and exportation.

·      The current actions and omissions of government make it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to protect their vital natural systems and a livable world. 

·      The actions and omissions of the government that increased CO2 emissions “shock the conscience,” and are infringing the plaintiffs’ right to life and liberty in violation of their substantive due process rights.

·      The government has violated plaintiffs’ equal protection rights embedded in the Fifth Amendment by denying them protections afforded to previous generations and by favoring short term economic interests of certain citizens.

·      The government’s acts and omissions violate the implicit right, via the Ninth Amendment, to a stable climate and an ocean and atmosphere free from dangerous levels of CO2.

·      The government is violating the public trust doctrine, secured by the Ninth Amendment, by denying future generations essential natural resources.

As is par for the course in these type of climate change suits, the United States filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that because the “chain of causation involves numerous third parties whose independent decisions collectively have a significant effect on plaintiffs’ injuries, the causal chain [is] too weak to support standing at the pleading stage.” 

Last Friday, in a decision that can only be described as monumental (Judge Coffin, who authored the opinion, himself opined that the lawsuit was “unprecedented”) the court disagreed:

[T]here is an alleged strong link between all the supposedly independent and numerous third party decisions given the government's regulation of CO2 emissions. . . . If the allegations in the complaint are to be believed, the failure to regulate the emissions has resulted in a danger of constitutional proportions to the public health. Presumably, sweeping regulations by this agency (the EPA) alone could result in curtailing of major CO2 producing activities by not just the defendant agencies, but by the purported independent third parties as well.  At this pleading stage, the court need not sort out the necessity or propriety of all the various agencies and individuals to participate as defendants, at least with respect to issues of standing.  For now, it is sufficient that EPA’s action/inaction with respect to the regulation of greenhouse gases allegedly results in the numerous instances of emissions that purportedly cause or will cause the plaintiffs harm.

In ruling that the lawsuit may proceed, Judge Coffin also stated the following in his decision:

The debate about climate change and its impact has been before various political bodies for some time now. Plaintiffs give this debate justifiability by asserting harms that befall or will befall them personally and to a greater extent than older segments of society. . . . It may be that eventually the alleged harms, assuming the correctness of plaintiffs’ analysis of impacts of global change, will befall all of us. But the intractability of the debates before Congress and state legislatures and the alleged valuing of short term economic interests despite the costs to human life, necessitates a need for the courts to evaluate the constitutional parameters of the action or inaction taken by government. This is especially true when such harms have an alleged disparate impact on a discrete class of society.

The government has until next Friday to appeal Judge Coffin’s order, and they surely will.  Given the potential that this ruling has to open the courthouse doors for tribal interests—a group that, remember, is “disproportionately impacted” by global warming and thus has more of a chance to chance to survive dismissal even if Judge Coffin’s order is ultimately overruled—this is one that Indian Country should be keeping a close eye on.  Using Juliana as a playbook, tribes harmed by global warning now have a very strong chance to overcome the procedural barriers that previously precluded governmental accountability in this arena. 

Note: The above graphic was obtained from Bob Weinhold, Climate Change and Health: A Native American Perspective, 118 Environ. Health Perspect. A64, A64 (2010).

Ryan Dreveskracht is an attorney with Galanda Broadman, PLLC, in Seattle.  His practice focuses on representing tribal governments and businesses in gaming, public affairs, taxation, and economic development.  He can be reached at (206) 909-3842 or ryan@galandabroadman.com. 

Who “Owns” Your Ancestors’ Remains?

By Joe Sexton

A recent Ninth Circuit decision in favor of the Navajo Nation sheds light on the difficulties tribal communities face bringing their Ancestors home after their resting places are disturbed and their skeletal remains are exhumed.[1]  Of course, how many indigenous people have permanently lost their Ancestors’ remains due to looting by non-Indians is unknown. 

But what happens when the federal government, i.e. American Indian tribes’ trustee, possesses ancestral remains and refuses to return them?

As the dispute in Navajo Nation v. United States reveals, tribes seeking to recover their Ancestors’ remains from their trustee face a complex and nearly impassible web of federal laws, regulations, and labyrinthine bureaucracy and usually litigation–all of which take years if not decades to navigate with no guarantee of success, even when “ownership” is clear and unambiguous. 

Ironically, federal bureaucrats exploit laws like the Native American Graves Protection Act (NAGPRA) to throw up roadblocks leading to indefinite delays, as has been the case in Navajo Nation.  In that case, over a period of roughly 60 years from 1931 to 1990, the federal government “removed 303 sets of human remains and associated funerary objects from Canyon de Chelly National Monument, a sacred site on the Navajo Reservation.”[2] 

The Navajo’s Treaty with the United States stipulates that the Navajo Reservation, which includes the Canyon de Chelly National Monument, was “set apart for the exclusive use and occupation” of the Navajo Nation.[3] 

Yet for whatever reason, for those six decades the federal government saw fit to disturb hundreds of indigenous graves and remove the human remains and other funerary objects laid within those graves from land it knew was owned by the Navajo Nation; land that was unquestionably set apart for the Nation’s exclusive use. 

When the Navajo descendants of those remains demanded return of their Ancestors, the federal government advised the Navajo Nation that under NAGPRA it was required to “inventory” the human remains and associated funerary objects.[4]  That was twenty years ago with no final resolution in sight.

In 1996 the Navajo Nation sent a letter to the Superintendent of Canyon de Chelly National Monument asserting ownership over “all human remains and associated funerary objects within the National Monument.”[5]  The federal government replied by letter, stating that it would “handle all . . . requests for repatriation in strict accordance with NAGPRA.”[6] 

In other words, effectively the federal government decided then that the Navajo Nation was not entitled to possession of the skeletal remains of Navajo Ancestors that had been exhumed from graves situated on Navajo Treaty lands until and unless the government completed its inventory process under NAGPRA, and then found under the statute and its regulations that the remains are “Native American” and affiliated with the Navajo Nation. 

In order to make such a finding, the Navajo Nation would be forced prove—to the satisfaction of the federal government and possibly a number of federal judges—a cultural and/or biological relationship between their Ancestors’ remains and the Navajo Nation as it exists today.[7] 

It’s twenty years later, and the Navajo Nation has still not won the battle for its Ancestors’ remains.  Although the Ninth Circuit ruled in the Nation’s favor this month, this ruling merely reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the Nation’s lawsuit.  The federal district court had dismissed the case based on its conclusion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Department of the Interior had not made a final agency action appealable under the Administrative Procedures Act.[8] 

Put simply, the Ninth Circuit overruled the district court’s dismissal, holding that when the Department of the Interior made the determination that NAGPRA applied in 1996, it made an appealable final agency action.  As the opinion notes:

We hold that the decision to apply NAGPRA to the remains and objects constituted final agency action because it was the consummation of the Park Service’s decisionmaking process regarding which statutory scheme would apply to determine the Navajo Nation’s property interests in the remains and objects, and significant legal consequences flow from the decision. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for consideration of the Navajo Nation’s claims challenging the applicability of NAGPRA.[9]

Thus, what the Navajo Nation has really won is the chance to make its case in federal court that it “owns” its Ancestors’ remains removed from its lands, and that those remains should not be subject to some indefinite NAGPRA inventory process and determination of Native American-ness overseen by federal bureaucrats.  In other words, the Nation has “won” the opportunity to go back to the district court and undertake what is likely to be several more years of litigation before it might finally get the opportunity to rebury its Ancestors. 

Unfortunately for other tribes whose Ancestors were laid to rest outside of their reservation lands—but nonetheless on lands the tribes occupied before they were forcibly removed to reservations—this case of “ownership” that the Navajo Nation has made is unavailable to them.  As the Ninth Circuit opinion notes:

The Navajo Nation contends that because its 1868 treaty provides it with the “exclusive use and occupation” of Canyon de Chelly, it owns the remains and objects that the Park Service hopes to inventory [under NAGPRA].[10]

The Navajo Nation’s argument that no NAGPRA process is required—and consequently, that the federal government’s decision to proceed under NAGPRA is appealable—rests on the fact that the remains at issue here were exhumed from Navajo Nation lands.  Accordingly, tribes facing a similar situation, but with Ancestors laid to rest outside their reservation boundaries, are left with little recourse but to proceed under the years-long expensive processes prescribed under NAGPRA and similar laws.

As the case of the “Ancient One” (or, as he is better known in the non-Indian world, “the Kennewick Man”) demonstrates, NAGPRA is a bureaucratic black hole for tribes.  In that case, after more than a decade of expensive litigation and scientific research supporting biological and cultural affiliation between the Ancient One and its claimant tribes—including state-of-the-art and conclusive DNA evidence—the Ancient One’s remains have still not been returned to his descendants for repatriation. 

In the meantime, countless Indian graves remain disturbed if not wholly excavated.  And to maintain that status quo, the federal government wields against tribes the very legislation that was passed under the auspices of protecting these imperiled burial grounds.  The Indian trustee uses NAGPRA to keep the Ancestors on the shelves of warehouses and museums, subject to years of “inventory” and legal process. 

Joe Sexton is Of Counsel with Galanda Broadman, PLLC.  Joe’s practice focuses on tribal sovereignty issues, including complex land and environmental issues, and economic development matters.  He can be reached at (509) 910-8842 and joe@galandbroadman.com.

[1] Navajo Nation v. U.S. Department of the Interior, D.C. No. 3:11-cv-08205- PGR, 2016 WL 1359869 (9th Cir. 2016).

[2] Id. at 1.

[3] Treaty Between the United States of America and the Navajo Tribe of Indians, U.S.-Navajo Nation, June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667, 671.

[4] Navajo Nation, 2016 WL 1359869 at 11.

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] See Bonnichsen, et al. v. United States et al., 217 F.Supp.2d 1116, 1136 (D. Or. 2002), aff’d 367 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2003), holding that “NAGPRA defines ‘Native American’ as ‘of, or relating to, a tribe, people or culture that is indigenous to the United States’ . . . Giving the ‘plain language’ of this provision its ordinary meaning, the use of the words ‘is’ and ‘relating’ in the present tense requires a relationship [between the remains and] a presently existing tribe, people, or culture.”

[8] Navajo Nation, 2016 WL 1359869 at 15.

[9] Id.

[10] Id. at 18.

The “Federal Indian”: Still Indian Despite Disenrollment

By Bree Black Horse

The Federal Government’s definition of an “Indian” is, in some instances, independent of an individual Indian’s tribal membership status.  Several federal laws confer various federal benefits and protections to individual Indians who are no longer, or who may have never been, members of a federally recognized tribe. Consider: the "federal Indian."

For instance, the Indian Arts and Crafts Act (IACA), 25 U.S.C. § 305, does not require an individual Indian to be a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe in order to incur federal protection of his or her Indian arts and crafts products.  IACA defines an “Indian” as both a person who is a member of an Indian tribe as well as a person who is a certified “Indian artisan.”  An “Indian artisan” is an individual who is certified by an Indian tribe as a non-member Indian artisan.  The statute entitles both tribal members and non-member Indian artisans to protections based on their designation as an “Indian,” irrespective of their underlying tribal member status.

Moreover, the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. § 1901, applies to Indian children who are members of or are eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.  ICWA defines an “Indian child” as an unmarried person under the age of eighteen who is either a member of an Indian tribe or who is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.  ICWA, therefore, likewise affords federal protections to “Indian children” regardless of their underlying tribal member status.

Further, the Indian Health Care Improvement Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1601, generally defines an “Indian” as any individual who, irrespective of whether he or she lives on or near a reservation, is a member of a tribe, including terminated and state recognized tribes, or who is a first or second degree descendant of a tribal member for the purposes of awarding scholarship and grant funding.  An individual who is considered by the Secretary of the Interior to be an Indian for any purpose or who is determined to be an Indian under the regulations promulgated by the Secretary also is considered an “Indian” for scholarship and grant purposes.

Although the scope of benefits accorded to Indians who lack membership in a federally recognized tribe is limited, this sampling of federal statues shows that the Federal Government’s trust responsibility to individual Indians does not conclude as a result of an individual Indian’s failure to enroll or of a tribal government’s disenrollment of that person.  In the view of the United States, at the very least, Indians do not cease to be Indians merely because they lack a certain political status as “members of a federally recognized Indian tribe.” 

But getting the Indian Trustee to do anything to protect the Indian—whether tribal member or “federal Indian”—per the United States’ moral trust obligations, is another story.

Bree Black Horse is an Associate in the Seattle office and a former Clerk for the U.S. District Court of Montana.  She is an enrolled citizen of the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma.  Bree can be reached at (206) 735 – 0448 or bree@galandabroadman.com. 

Wash. State Recognizes "Honor" of Eagle Feathers at Graduation Ceremonies

The Washington State Office of Public Instruction and its Superintendent Randy Dorn recently issued a letter to state schools regarding "tribal students wearing items of cultural significance such as eagle feathers during graduation ceremonies."  The State concludes that a student wearing an eagle feather "should not be viewed as a violation of the graduation ceremony dress codes."

Gabe Galanda to Teach Seattle Lawyers of Color Re "Building a Book of Business"

Gabe Galanda will reprise his part of a presentation, "Building a Book of Business for Lawyers of Color," on behalf of the King County Bar Association on March 30 at 6 PM.

Gabe Galanda is the managing lawyer of Galanda Broadman, PLLC, an American Indian-owned law firm with offices in Seattle and Yakima, Washington and Bend, Oregon. He descends from the Nomlaki and Concow Tribes, belonging to the Round Valley Indian Confederation.

"County Acted Negligently And With Deliberate Indifference" Towards Native Inmate

The Mason County Journal has chronicled our pending U.S. District Court federal civil rights case against the Mason County Jail and its associates, arising from the suicide of a Skokomish man while in jail.  View full article.  

Ryan Dreveskracht is quoted at length:

“(There is a) civil right to not be treated with deliberate indifference and that includes having your known medical illnesses cared for, and here they knew that he had medical issues and they were deliberately indifferent,” Dreveskracht said. . .

“There are numerous instances here where we believe that the county acted negligently and with deliberate indifference,” Dreveskracht said. “We want to hold the county liable for their unofficial policies of ignoring mentally ill inmates and outright failure to implement sufficient suicide prevention procedures. “There was, and still is, a complete absence of training to address mentally-ill inmates, and a lack of funding to provide that necessary training.” . . .

“It happened in 1999 to a young man in an eerily similar situation, yet the county’s policies have not changed,” Dreveskracht said. “We don’t want this to happen again and want to hold the county accountable.”

Ryan Dreveskracht is an attorney with Galanda Broadman, PLLC, in Seattle.   He can be reached at (206) 909-3842 or ryan@galandabroadman.com. 

Busy 2016 Indian Law Calendar for Washington State Supreme Court

The Washington State Supreme Court will hear at least three important Indian law cases this year, showing a steady increase from the past several years when it has typically heard between zero and two Indian law cases.  

The Court is scheduled to hear City of Snoqualmie v. Constantine regarding the constitutionality of property tax exemptions for tribally-owned property; Lundgren and Lundgren v. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, which deals with sovereign immunity from adverse possession claims; and an ICWA active efforts case, In re the Adoption of T.A.W., R.B. and C.B. v. C.W. 

Below is a chart of the Court and its Justices' voting patterns in tribal cases, over the last decade. Stay tuned for what could be a busy year in Washington State Indian law.

Case	Pro-Tribal Interests	Anti-Tribal Interests
Wright (tribal corporate sovereign immunity) - 2005	Madsen Owens Fairhurst	C. Johnson J. Johnson
Eriksen (tribal detention of traffic offender in fresh pursuit, off reservation) - 2011	Owens C. Johnson	Stephens Wiggins Fairhurst Madsen J. Johnson
Jim (state jurisdiction over Treaty in lieu sites) - 2012	Owens C. Johnson Fairhurst Stephens	J. Johnson Madsen Wiggins
AUTO I (tribal indispensability to third-party fuel compact challenges) - 2012	Madsen Owens Fairhurst González	C. Johnson J. Johnson Stephens Wiggins
Clark (state search warrant execution in Washington Indian Country) - 2013		Unanimous Madsen C. Johnson Owens J.Johnson Stephens Wiggins Gonzalez McCloud Fairhurst (Opinion)
Outsource Services Management, LLC v. Nooksack Business Corporation (contractual waiver of sovereign immunity) - 2013	McCloud González	Owens Madsen C. Johnson Fairhurst Stephens Wiggins Worswick*
State v. Shale (state criminal jurisdiction over Indian on another tribe’s reservation trust lands) - 2015		Unanimous Madsen C. Johnson Owens Fairhurst Stephens Wiggins Gordon McCloud YuGonzalez (Opinion)
AUTO II (constitutionality of state-tribal tax agreements) - 2015	Unanimous Madsen C. Johnson Owens Fairhurst Stephens Wiggins Gordon McCloud YuGonzalez (Opinion)
City of Snoqualmie v. Constantine (constitutionality of property tax exemption for tribally-owned property)	TBD
Lundgren and Lundgren v. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe (sovereign immunity; adverse possession)	TBD
In re the Adoption of T.A.W., R.B. and C.B. v. C.W. (ICWA active efforts)	TBD

Anthony Broadman is a partner at Galanda Broadman PLLC.  He can be reached at 206.321.2672, anthony@galandabroadman.com, or via www.galandabroadman.com.

G.Galanda, R.Dreveskracht to Discuss "Origins of Disenrollment" at UDub Law on Feb. 26

On Friday, February 26 at 4:30 PM, in Room 127, Gabe Galanda and Ryan Dreveskracht will join Professor David Wilkins to discuss the "Origins of Disenrollment."  They will specifically discuss the "tension between tribal self-determination and federal trust duty and moral obligation."  The forum is being sponsored by the UW Law Diversity Committee.